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This paper provides a review of past attempts to harness the uplift in land 
values arising from granting planning permission to better understand the 
current difficulties of the use of land value capture.   The scheme has been 
the most successful approach to date, but the theoretical fundamentals are 
fudged and there are substantial policy variations between localities: a 
victory of practicality over principle.  We argue that a tax on development 
value would be more effective whilst maintaining the principles of taxing 
socially generated land values. 
  
1.  Introduction 
There is a continuing international policy debate about how to best to 
harness high land values for the public good.  The current use of planning 
obligations in the UK has been subject to increasing scepticism about its 
effectiveness (Stephens, 2019).  This issue has gained traction recently as 
there is a political consensus that more housing is required  One way to 
increase affordable housing is to better harness the uplift in land value from 
the granting of planning permission (Aubrey, 2018).  A recent House of 
Commons committee noted:  
“For decades, (UK) governments have sought to capture increases in 
land value, but with limited success. When considering new 
mechanisms for land value capture, it is vital that we learn the right 
lessons from the past.”  (HOC, 2018, p47) 
Taxing socially generated land values has been considered for more than a 
century, although policies designed to harness them were implemented only 
after World War II.  This question is sometimes referred to as the ‘betterment’ 
problem, and more recently as ‘planning gain’ or ‘land value capture’.   
 
This paper assesses the different attempts at capturing socially generated 
land values in the UK.  Land values are primarily ‘socially’-generated by 
surrounding economic activities, the provision of infrastructure required to 
make a site viable, and crucially by the state’s ownership of development 
rights. Consequently, uplift in land value can be justifiably taxed (Prest, 1981).    
 
We begin by locating the UK’s approach within an international context in 
order to distil its special characteristics. An explanation of research methods 
follows in Section Three. Sections Four and Five examine the history of the UK’s 
approach and individual initiatives respectively. Conclusions follow in the final 
section.     
 
2. Locating the UK’s approach in an international context 
At the outset it is useful to locate the UK’s approach to land value capture in 
an international context as this helps to highlight its special features.  We may 
distinguish between countries that operate public leasehold systems and 
those that, like the UK, operate freehold systems.  
 
We would expect land value capture to be most straightforward in public 
leasehold systems, such as China where all urban land is held on a leasehold 
basis from the state.  Local long-term land use planning provides a framework 
for the choice of plots for sale together with use and development restrictions 
(such as the floor-to-area ratio) of greenfield and brownfield redevelopment.  
These land units are then auctioned to private developers (Cai et al, 2013).  
Developers may seek to influence what infrastructure contributions are 
required when the detailed plan is being drawn up. Requirements are 
therefore established before any auctioning occurs (Liu and Zeng, 2019). 
Genuine negotiations are exceptional, but have been used in urban villages 
to enable use rights to be transferred directly to developers without first 
transferring them to the state (Liu and Zeng, 2019).  In Hong Kong like the rest 
of China, all land is similarly granted on a public leasehold basis.  A lease 
modification premium is chargeable to acquire additional rights for land 
redevelopment.  The premium is equivalent to the enhancement in current 
land value (Hui et al, 2004).   
 
A similar position exists in Singapore where most land is leasehold with the 
government as the predominant landowner, owning approximately 85 
percent of land.  Leaseholders may be required to pay a ‘development 
charge’ if they wish to increase the density of the land or change in its use.   
This development charge varies by area and land use type and is updated 
every six months (URA, 2019a).  The development charge was formerly known 
as the ‘differential premium’ (Hui et al, 2004).  The government can also 
compulsory purchase land for (re)development via the Singapore Land 
Authority.  This land is then allocated by way of open public tender (URA, 
2019b).   
 
In these Asian countries where there is public ownership of land it is in theory 
relatively easy to collect socially generated land values with clearly explicit 
rules on land value capture.  Outside of Asia Canberra, the capital of 
Australia, is an isolated case of all land publicly owned with long private 
leaseholds.  Bourassa et al (1997) demonstrate by reference to a study of the 
city that the valuation practicalities in such a system are not as 
straightforward as they appear, with potential weak incentives for 
development. 
 
In freehold systems one way to approach land value capture is the 
compulsory purchase or public acquisition of land prior to (re)development.  
This is broadly the approach applied in Germany and known as “Land 
Readjustment”.  Local authorities temporarily combine through a voluntary 
basis the ownership of land earmarked for new (re) development.  The land 
in a designated area is pooled by owners. The local authority assesses land 
values before (existing use) and after the “readjustment”.  The original 
landowners have their land returned to then on completion of the scheme, 
but the authority retains the increase in value up to 30% for greenfield and up 
to 10% for brownfield land (Crook, 2018).  
 
The procedure has been applied over many decades as a means of sharing 
the cost of infrastructure between developers and the local authority. This 
mechanism permits the local authority to fund the costs of land preparation 
and infrastructure and to shape the nature of development.   The community 
via the local authority may also make a ‘profit’ from the uplift in land value 
although this is generally confined to high land value areas (Crook, 2018). 
 
In the Netherlands local authorities applied a similar active land policy from 
1945 to 2008 whereby a large proportion of development took place on land 
that would be bought at market value, serviced and then sold on to 
developers.  This policy came unstuck with the global financial crisis.  In 2008 
the Physical Planning Act heralded a more passive approach to planning 
that introduced the formal obligation for developers to pay a contribution 
toward infrastructure costs (Buitelaar and Bregman, 2016).  Since then it has 
also been possible for local authorities to enjoin with a voluntary agreement 
with developers to finance large infrastructure.  Muñoz Gielen and Lenfrerink 
(2018) estimate that only one-quarter of municipalities employ developer 
contributions to pay for large-scale infrastructure, and even then these do 
not fully compensate for the loss of municipal finance.  Legally, public value 
capture is limited to cost recovery but there is a widely held view that such 
policies have not been successful (Buitelaar and Bregman, 2016; Muñoz 
Gielen and Lenferink, 2018). 
 
Charges for infrastructure costs in the Netherlands are therefore now 
recouped directly from developers and this approach is also applied in 
Germany for developers building on their own land (Crook, 2018).  Other 
examples of charging developers for infrastructure costs include ‘impact 
fees’ in the USA (Burge and Ihlanfeldt, 2006), These impact fees are one off 
levies that are applied based on a predetermined formula set by a local 
government unit, and paid by property developers during the permit 
approval process. They are used for the provision of social infrastructure 
services including roads, schools, parks, and libraries, as well as water and 
sewers.  They are not universally applied by local government (Burge and 
Ihlanfeldt, 2006). 
 
Similar mechanisms apply in provinces of Canada requiring developers 
providing social infrastructure on rezoning including parks, known for example 
as Community Amenity Contributions in British Columbia (Jones et al, 2018). 
 
Land value capture has also been applied specifically towards meeting 
individual rail transit schemes in Hong Kong and Tokyo.  In Hong Kong, where 
there is a public leasehold system, the rail operator ‘bought’ the land around 
proposed stations at existing use and then ‘sold’ on completion of a station 
at a higher value. In Tokyo where there is a market freehold system land 
owners adjacent to proposed stations pool their land to mutual benefit within 
a state defined framework to distribute the benefits between themselves and 
the rail company.  It is similar to the German ‘Land Readjustment’ noted 
above.  While this broad approach to rail infrastructure funding based on 
land value capture is generating interest elsewhere in the world, such as 
India, the financial benefits represent only a minor contribution to the total 
costs (Suzuki et al, 2015). 
 
This brief review has demonstrated that around the world most land value 
capture schemes are aimed as a means to fund infrastructure costs, 
sometimes encompassing social facilities.  There are two essential 
approaches – directly charging developers or a process of land pooling 
through public purchase. Schemes designed purely to harness socially 
created land values are confined to countries with public leasehold systems.  
The UK appears to be almost unique as a country with a market freehold 
system in seeking to tax this uplift in value (except perhaps Columbia and 
Israel linked to zoning changes), and therefore there may be lessons to be 
learnt for a global audience.  
 
3. UK Overview and Research Method 
Over the decades in the UK there have been a number of tax initiatives to 
capture increases in land values arising from the granting of planning 
permission. However, there are numerous practicalities to the taxing of the 
uplift, linked to reducing incentives to bringing land forward for development, 
the valuation of land, who should pay the tax and when.   
 
Drawing on a range of historical contemporary sources, this paper seeks to 
draw lessons from the past for assessing the current use of land value 
capture.  It builds on a report by the authors to the Scottish Land Commission 
(Jones et al, 2018).    It chronicles the theoretical basis, effectiveness and 
practical differences of UK land value capture initiatives since World War II.  It 
compares experiences of historic approaches to evaluate the current system 
of planning obligations of developers, using the following framework.  For 
each scheme, the study provides detail of its practical application noting 
specific workings including for example the rate of taxation, how the tax was 
collected, and when in the development process.  Each scheme is reviewed 
in the context of the political, planning and property market environment at 
the time.   The role of the macroeconomy and the property cycle is a key 
focus on the assessment of each scheme’s effectiveness.  This issue has often 
been ignored in previous assessments.   
 
4. History of UK Tax Initiatives   
Rapid urbanisation in the nineteenth century with its rise in land values on 
once agriculture land stoked the argument for a ‘betterment’ tax on socially 
generated value.   The principle of taxing betterment was introduced in the 
UK’s first planning act in 1909 and was extended in the inter-war period. 
However, the tax was applied in only a small number of cases before 1939, 
because planning was constrained by the possibility of compensating 
landowners for losses arising from the refusal to allow development 
(Cullingworth and Nadin, 1997).  It was only after the Second World War that 
concerted efforts were made to capture some or all of the development 
gains associated with residential planning permissions: 
 Development Charge contained in the 1947 Town and Country 
Planning Act 
 Land Commission and Betterment Levy launched in 1967 
 Development Gains Tax introduced in 1973 
 Community Land Act 1975 and Development Land Tax implemented in 
1976 
 Planning Obligations since 1991 through Section 106 agreements in 
England and Section 75 agreements in Scotland since 1997 
 Infrastructure Levies introduced in England Wales in 2010. 
 
The Development Charge introduced under the post-war Labour 
government followed from the Uthwatt Committee (1942) that 
recommended the nationalisation of development rights. Consequently, the 
uplift in land values arising from planning permission were treated as 
belonging to the community so could be taxed, and that the refusal to grant 
permission to develop did not merit compensation.  This betterment tax was 
seen as a way to end land speculation.  However, the Conservative 
Government elected in 1951 saw the Development Charge as an 
impediment to housebuilding and abolished it for development begun on or 
after 18th November, 1952. 
 
In the mid-1950s a building boom started with the post-war rebuilding of the 
economy, also bringing a rapid rise in land prices and fears of property 
speculation.  The Labour Party placed the Land Commission as a central 
element of its 1964 electoral programme to establish a ‘new Britain’ (Weiler, 
2008).  The Land Commission began life in April 1967 with two very different 
but complementary functions.  First, it was as a public corporation tasked with 
buying all land needed for development.  Second, in the short term it was to 
be a revenue collection agency of the Betterment Levy on development 
value when land was sold in market transactions.  The Land Commission 
purchased land on a net of tax basis, i.e. market value less the Betterment 
Levy applicable (Weiler, 2008). 
 
The political dimension to these policies can be seen by the abolition of the 
Development Levy and Land Commission in July 1970, a month after a 
Conservative Government was elected. Land transactions were then by 
default subject to capital gains tax that had been introduced in 1965. Taxing 
of land transactions returned to the position that applied between 1965 and 
1967.  However, a dramatic boom in residential and commercial property 
values in the early 1970s brought again increasing public concern about 
speculation with some offices were kept empty even though land values 
were rising (Fraser, 1984).    
 
The Conservative Government came under pressure to address inflationary 
pressures exacerbated dramatically by oil prices quadrupling in November 
1973.  In December it introduced greater restrictions on personal loans, public 
expenditure cuts and a Development Gains Tax (Fraser, 1984).  The 
government lost power in February 1974 and the Development Gains Tax was 
continued as an interim measure by the subsequent Labour government. The 
tax was based on the principle that development gains would be treated as 
income.  For individuals realised development land gains were taxed at their 
marginal income tax rate and for companies such gains were taxed at the 
corporation tax rate.  It was collected as part of general taxation procedures 
linked to Capital Gains Tax (Prest, 1981). 
 
The Labour Party pledged to tackle the commercial property boom in its 1974 
election manifestos. The White Paper, ‘Land’, in September 1974 preceding 
the legislation stressed the links between planning and betterment to ensure 
an effective planning system (HM Government, 1974).  The argument was 
based on the restrictions on planning caused by the market price of some 
land, and that land in private ownership could be a resource that is not at 
the disposal of the community.  
 
The White Paper proposed that the acquisition and disposal of development 
land be the responsibility of local authorities (except in Wales). The land to be 
acquired would be that which the local authority viewed as required for 
(re)development over the next ten years. It was argued that local authorities’ 
acquisition of all land required for private development in this way would 
permit more positive and comprehensive planning (HM Government, 1974). 
 
Eventually local authorities would have a duty to purchase all development 
land.  However, the government realised that transitional arrangements were 
necessary.  During this period local authorities would pay for the land at 
market price minus a new Development Land Tax.  This new tax was a tax on 
80% of the difference between development value and current use value, 
and was to replace Development Gains Tax. The principle of the policy was 
that the community was to benefit from increases in development value, 
while the scheme would leave the private owner in the same position 
whether a person sold to a local authority or to a private purchaser (HM 
Government, 1974).  
 
In 1979 the incoming Conservative government soon repealed the 
Community Land Act, but retained the Development Land Tax, albeit at a 
lower rate of 60%. At that time, there appeared consensus as it also 
announced it would not be reducing it again during the lifetime of the 
Parliament. Nevertheless, Conservative MPs continued to lobby for its 
abolition and the 1985 Budget did just that.  
 
During the 1980s there was a sea change from the post-war period when 
most infrastructure was paid for by the state to a position that local authorities 
increasingly applied ‘planning obligations’ on private developers to pay for it. 
Previously obligations on developers had existed as a rarely used mechanism, 
and Catney and Henneberry (2019) see their emergence as a movement 
towards neoliberalism.  In England the legal basis for these obligations was 
codified by the 1990 Town and Country Planning Act (and subsequent 
amendments), and are commonly referred to as ‘Section 106 Agreements’.  
The equivalent legislative basis for planning obligations in Scotland is the 1997 
Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act, where the term ‘Section 75 
Agreements’ is used.  
 
The use of planning agreements brings together funding of infrastructure and 
services at a local level and the capture of development value.  They include 
the requirement to provide or fund ‘affordable’ housing.  Part of the 
motivation was the promotion of ‘mixed’ communities through ‘affordable’ 
and market housing on the same site.  A parallel initiative emerged in the 
United States during the housing boom of the 2000s in the form of “inclusion 
zones”.  In these zones developers provide a percentage of affordable 
housing usually on a mandatory basis, but sometimes they receive an 
incentive in return (Mukhija et al, 2015). 
 
Planning agreements have proved to be durable having continued in 
operation to the present day under successive governments.  In addition, the 
Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL) was introduced in 2010 in England and 
Wales. CIL is a national scheme and involves a set charge per square metre to 
enable private sector provision of infrastructure.  Initially it was proposed as a 
cost of development rather than a tax on land value uplift, although there is 
a degree of interaction (Barker, 2004).   
 
5. Assessment of Individual Initiatives 
In this section we provide an assessment of individual initiatives against a 
number of criteria. These include the aims of the policies, their longevity, the 
ways in which they were implemented (e.g. national, local), the influence of 
economic/property cycles, the amounts raised, whether they met objectives 
and their unintended consequences.  
 
5.1 Development Charge 1947 
Labour’s land policies after 1945 were designed as a step toward land 
nationalisation and the ending of speculation.  A ‘Development Charge’ was 
introduced on the basis that any increase in value arising from the granting of 
planning permission should be paid to the state. The charge collected 100% 
of this increase in value and was paid by the purchaser. A Central Land 
Board was established to collect the charge. It was anticipated that this 
would result in all land transactions being at existing or current use value 
(prior to planning permission). By lowering the price of land in this way it 
would make it easier in particular to provide public housing. At the same 
time, the money raised by the Development Charge would support meeting 
housing needs. 
 
As the scheme was conceived as land nationalisation it encompassed small 
land plots and all planning permissions.  The result was a large bureaucratic 
task with many charges ultimately assessed as zero. For example, in 1950-51 
out of 9011 potential Development Charge submissions 76% were assessed as 
ineligible or zero (Central Land Board, 1951).  Many owners of small plots, 
bought with a view to building a house, received a Development Charge in 
effect doubling the price of the land.  This was because the existing use value 
was deemed to be nominal.   
 
The Central Land Board had compulsory purchase powers, but land 
ownership was only to be temporary. Once purchased (at current use value) 
the Board was expected to dispose of the land by private sale or auction at 
market value.  However, it was only prepared to use compulsory purchase 
powers to support purchasers when development was being held up.  In 
other words, the Board only applied these powers in a responsive mode. The 
Board made only up to 35 confirmed compulsory purchase orders.  
 
The theory of the Act was that all land transactions would be at current use 
value as there was a 100% tax above that.  However, owners were reluctant 
to sell at existing use value.  In its 1950 report the Central Land Board (1950) 
accepted that a market in land at existing use value had failed to 
materialise.  The key factor was time limited building licences introduced in 
1940 that were heavily rationed (Blundell, 1993).  There were many bomb sites 
ripe for development and rising demand for housing and commercial/ 
industrial property, but the system of building licences combined with capital 
issue controls and a shortage of building materials meant that there were 
many barriers.  There was virtually no commercial development between 
1945 and 1950 for example in Scotland (Cullingworth, 1980), with most of the 
new housing in the public sector, a direct result of government policy (Jones 
and Murie, 2006).  
 
Overall land values tended to be above current use values partly because of 
scarcity caused by building licences, partly because the values of existing 
buildings influenced the viability of development and land prices, and partly 
because the Central Land Board’s compulsory purchase powers were 
applied infrequently. The post-war building restrictions meant that land 
transactions were significantly reduced, an effect that was exacerbated by 
sellers waiting for a change of government and the subsequent abolition of 
the Development Charge.  Rather than ending land speculation, the 
Development Charge actually encouraged it.   
 
One short term legacy was that the purchase of land for public purposes was 
based on its current use rather than the market value until 1958.   This in itself 
was a mechanism for capturing socially generated land values.  However, 
ever since local authority acquisition of land has been on the basis of market 
value.   
 
5.2 Land Commission and Betterment Levy 
The Land Commission became operative in April 1967.  The Betterment Levy 
was charged when planning permission was granted or when land was sold 
and development value was realised.  The levy payer was the seller of land 
(in the 1947 Act it was the purchaser).  The levy was calculated using a 
complicated formula based on ‘development value’.  The levy rate was set 
an initial rate of 40% that the government intended to increase to 45% and 
then 50% after reasonably short intervals.  These increases never happened. 
‘Development Value’ was defined in the legislation as the increment in the 
land value which is due to the likelihood of its being put to a more profitable 
use than its current use. This might stem not just from the existence of a 
planning permission; but the Act also noted that land might also have 
development (hope) value as a result of the market’s judgement of the 
possibility of obtaining permission.  
 
The Land Commission suffered from the scale and complexity of its task. 
Collecting the Betterment Levy involved over 100,000 transactions a year with 
also approximately 500,000 planning applications. The compulsory purchase 
of development land when necessary took at least six months (Weiler, 2008).  
Many transactions were also very small, garden plots for development.  As a 
result of further legislation to address these issues unpaid levy assessments 
below £1000 were waived (Land Commission, 1968).   
 
The Commission soon realised that the ‘land problem; at the time was a 
shortage of building land allocated in development plans (Land Commission, 
1968). This finding exposed the fallacy of the reasoning behind the 
establishment of the Land Commission.  It had been presumed that the high 
land prices were created by land speculators withholding land, but it was 
actually the reluctance of local authorities to designate development land. It 
was also a major obstacle to the Commission as many local authorities did 
not want to cooperate.  The thinking behind the Commission had evolved at 
the end of a property boom when undoubtedly there had been speculation.  
The error was to assume this as an inherent problem rather than a cyclical 
phenomenon. 
 
It is also important to set the land market in a wider context.  It was a period 
of modest economic growth with quiet commercial development activity 
constrained by the lack of finance and its rising cost.   A credit squeeze was 
introduced in 1968 and subsequently tightened.  House prices rose nominally 
by around 20% between 1967 and 1970 but in real terms there was no 
change (Denman, 1971).   
 
At the same time as the housing market was stable builders had also bought 
land in advance of development requirements as the Labour Government’s 
strategy had been well trailed, following the White Paper in 1965.  As a 
landowner became liable for "chargeable acts" after 6th April 1967 this also 
led to a rush to start token ‘development’ before this deadline by digging 
trenches, etc.  The result was a prolonged period of stagnation in 
development land sales in 1967.  This had knock on effects for the collection 
of the Betterment Levy so by the end of the first financial year the assessed 
levy amounted to only £1.6m, and collection to £0.5m.  Over the three years 
to 31st March 1970 assessments of Betterment Levy (together with interest) 
amounted to £48.7m.  The collection of Betterment Levy was therefore 
muted.  Instead of the £80m expected in a full year, only £15m was raised in 
1968-69 and in the following year only £31m.   
 
It can be argued that that the low level of levy collected reflected the 
weakness of the Land Commission. Given that the Land Commission was 
having difficulties in meeting its goals this probably gave rise to uncertainty 
about its future.  It may well have led to a reluctance of landowners to part 
with their land, anticipating a change in government or the abolition of the 
Development Levy. As land became less, rather than more readily available 
this would have tended to raise the price of what land was available.  
 
5.3 Development Gains Tax 
Development Gains Tax was applied after 17th December 1973 and followed 
the principles and procedures for Capital Gains Tax.  The tax proved to be an 
irrelevance. The policy measures of late 1973 ended the consumer boom 
that had been the prop to a property boom.  With the economic climate 
deteriorating, high interest rates, capital and rental values falling, building 
costs rising at the order of 25 to 30% a year there was only minimal 
development initiated (Fraser, 1984).  There was also a slump in the housing 
market caused by a mortgage famine.  Over the life of this tax development 
activity across all sectors was moribund. The timing and brevity of the tax 
meant that it had no impact. The main lesson is that the revenue from these 
types of taxes are very dependent on the property cycle. 
 
5.4 Community Land Act and Development Land Tax 
The Act came into effect in April 1976.  Local authorities were given power to 
acquire land by agreement or compulsory purchase.  Local authorities, 
having acquired land, had the responsibility of ensuring it was developed, 
either by themselves or others.  Exemptions from acquisition included single 
houses and buildings used in agriculture (Prest, 1981).  Local authorities 
bought land for development at just above current use value (i.e. 
development value minus the Development Land Tax, 80% tax on uplift) and 
could sell at development value. To ensure that the local community 
retained a share of future increases in value this disposal could be on a 
leasehold basis. This leasehold arrangement would apply to commercial and 
industrial development.  Land for residential purposes was to be sold off, 
either freehold, or via a building licence to the builder.  The land was to be 
purchased within five year rolling programmes to build up land banks to have 
sufficient (re)development for up to ten years ahead.   
The legislation suffered a mortal blow as a result of the continuing weakness 
of the economy.  In October 1976 there was a sterling crisis that led to a 
£2.3bn loan from the International Monetary Fund.  The loan came 
conditional on budget cuts of £2.5bn which brought significant impacts for 
local authority spending (Fraser, 1984).  These unforeseen changes in the 
fiscal environment, just two months after the Act became operative, meant 
that land purchase plans received a heavy setback. A central government 
guidance note announced that local authority borrowing limits to buy land 
were reduced by almost half (Blundell, 1994).  
 
Development Land Tax continued under the subsequent Conservative 
Government until 1985.  It was conceived in a period of highly speculative 
activity in the property market that led to a partial political consensus 
(except the rate of collection), and it survived for nearly ten years.   It 
required very complex legislation and it was complicated to collect.   It 
operated during a period of severe property market volatility that hampered 
its revenue generation.  The economy was the dominant influence on 
development activity not the tax.  When the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
abolished it he indicated that it raised a net annual income of £45m, 
suggesting it was of limited impact (Lawson, 1985). 
 
5.5 Planning Obligations 
The most recent attempt at land value capture has been the use of 
obligations on a developer in return for planning permission.  Provision of 
affordable housing is the primary community wide obligation.   These 
agreements in England have contributed significant numbers of affordable 
homes and a high proportion of such housing over the last decade or so 
(Lord et al, 2018).  However, planning obligations in England have had a 
marked geographical pattern.  Land value uplift is greatest in the south/ 
south-east, so that obligations play only a significant role in providing 
affordable housing in these areas (Burgess and Monk, 2016).  Similarly, a 
Scottish study finds that more than half of developer supported affordable 
housing units are in urban areas where land values are high, while small towns 
and rural communities hardly benefit (Scottish Government, 2012). 
 
Affordable housing obligations are expressed as a percentage of the housing 
to be built.  Research suggests that targets in local plans in England vary from 
10-50% (Crook et al, 2016) with current government guidance recommending 
a 10% minimum (MGLGC, 2019).   There is also guidance on minimum plot-size 
thresholds, and contributions may take the form of payments, where on-site 
provision of affordable housing is not feasible.   However, the policy is 
implemented at the local level so there is scope for interpretation, and 
indeed Manchester for some years completely undermined its own rules, 
allowing large developments to proceed without affordable housing (Pidd, 
2018).  
 
Unlike previous land capture schemes obligations are therefore in many 
cases effectively negotiated (previous schemes had mechanisms to dispute 
valuations but not the tax rate).  This in turn raises a number of questions.  First, 
if there are not clear rules set by an authority on obligations it undermines the 
effectiveness of the tax to lower the price paid to the original landowner.   
The cost of the obligations may actually be passed on to future owners 
(Jones and Watkins, 2009).  Second, there is no clear assessment of the 
percentage increase in land value that is captured.   Aubrey (2018)  
estimated that the average percentage from planning permission is around 
25-27% in England, but McAllister et al (2018) put the figure at 45-65% from a 
study of London, 2005-2017.  An investigation by a House of Commons 
committee concludes that the figure is around 50% without any real 
evidence (HOC, 2018). 
 
A key issue is that local planning authorities do not have the skills to set 
benchmarks for affordable housing obligations that relate to development 
viability (Jones and Watkins, 2009; HOC, 2018).  Individual outcomes will 
depend on the extent of knowledge possessed by different parties and their 
relative negotiating skills (Robertson and Clandillon, 2015). A consultancy 
industry specialising in reducing developers’ planning obligations has grown 
up (Stephens, 2018).  Sayce et al (2018) argue that this contributes to a 
‘power imbalance’ between planners and developers.  They found that in 
London the levels of affordable housing provision have fallen despite large 
rises in land values and house prices since the market bottomed out in 2009. 
They conclude that developers, given new regulations introduced in 2012 
(see below), may over-bid for land knowing that they can compensate by 
negotiating a reduction in affordable housing levels.   
  
Negotiations around viability are therefore a major issue.  Academic research 
on appraisal practices used in viability tests finds them inconsistent and 
sometimes flawed (Crosby, et al, 2013), and lacking in transparency (Sayce, 
et al, 2017). Sayce, et al, (2018) argue that,   
‘Viability testing, through the use of development appraisals, is a 
complex process and one that is capable of manipulation through the 
use of a wide variety of input data, which may remain hidden from 
public scrutiny and undeclared unless the matter proceeds to appeal.’ 
(p. 5)  
Market conditions are also a key variable in the viability equation. The use of 
residual viability appraisals to establish planning obligations are very 
dependent on timing (Crosby et al, 2013) and in a rising market 
underestimate developers’ profits (Sayce et al, 2018).  In this context it is 
important to note that planning obligations were introduced at the 
beginning of a long upturn in house prices that developed into a boom, 
reaching its peak at the end of 2007 (Jones and Watkins, 2009). The property 
bust following the global financial crisis exposed this issue.  Obligations 
agreed at the height of the house price boom generated severe financial 
difficulties for developers as house prices fell.   
 
Subsequent changes in English regulations, with a new National Planning 
Framework in 2012 (CLG, 2012) allowed many previously agreed Section 106 
obligations to be renegotiated in the light of changed market conditions. The 
detail of these changes provide for a guaranteed return to developers, 
importantly, making obligations the ‘residual’ rather than the land price in a 
development financial appraisal (Crosby, 2019).  Such a change 
fundamentally undermined the basis of the land value capture process.  
 
The government has subsequently responded by changing the guidance in 
2018 with a clear return to the essential principles that local policy 
requirements should be set out so they can be accurately accounted for in 
the price paid for land (MHLGC, 2018).   The most recent planning guidance 
also states that viability statements should be publicly available (MHLGC, 
2019) in response to past criticism.  Nevertheless the essential negotiation 
process remains. 
 
Despite the flaws in development appraisals and a negotiation process that 
favours developers obligations in England have been more successful in 
capturing increased land values arising from planning permission than 
previous approaches.  The visibility of the fruits of planning obligation in the 
area that the development occurs also helps to secure acceptance from the 
community.  However, it is unclear what percentage of socially generated 
land values have been collected through obligations. The acceptability to 
developers is probably because of the relatively low tax rate compared to 
previous schemes.  Nevertheless lack of transparency, ostensibly because of 
commercial confidentiality, serves to reduce the legitimacy of the system.  It 
has left many unanswered questions. 
 
5.6 Infrastructure Levies 
It is generally agreed that the Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL) introduced 
in 2010 has not worked effectively because of its practical complexity and its 
large exemptions (HOC, 2018).   In fact many authorities in the north of 
England have declined to operate it because it was too expensive to 
administer (CIL Review Team, 2016).  A study found that CIL generated on 
average only 2% of the market value of a development project (Reading 
University and Three Dragons, 2017).  A government review (CIL Review Team, 
2016) recommended replacing it with a ‘Local Infrastructure Tariff’ that would 
be non-negotiable applicable to all developments, together with a ‘Strategic 
Infrastructure Tariff’ to  be applied for major infrastructure projects (similar 
schemes elsewhere in the world, see earlier). 
 
The latter proposal is based on the special CIL imposed by the Mayor of 
London, applicable to all commercial development, to contribute to the 
funding for a specific piece of infrastructure.  This is the Crossrail rail link 
currently being built across the city, mainly underground.  The logic of the 
charging scheme is based on the differential benefits that are generated to 
localities (GLA, 2016).  This levy was set as a rate per square metre on the size 
of each commercial development at a relatively low level, and applied 
across the city, in a tapered fashion with three rates - central, inner and outer 
London.  Unlike other such UK levies there are no exemptions.  
 
This Mayoral CIL began in 2010 and was initially targeted to raise £300m over 
seven years (GLA, 2016).  By the end of the financial year 2017-18 the 
cumulative monies collected were just short of £500m (GLA, 2018).   Arguably 
its success was based on its mandatory and simple nature.   Furthermore 
closer examination of the scheme reveals that it is not actually a contribution 
towards infrastructure costs but a tax on the likely increase in property values 
generated by the rail link (tax falling with distance from it). 
  
 
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
Most of recent policies aimed at capturing the uplift in land values have 
centred on funding infrastructure costs.  The exceptions are some Asian 
countries with public leasehold systems and the UK that have sought to tax 
socially generated land values per se.  The Asian countries have an 
advantage because public leaseholds enable significant control of land use 
change.  In the UK the freehold land system together with its flexible passive 
planning system sets substantial challenges for land value capture.  An 
overview of the UK’s long history of land value capture schemes is provided in 
Table 1 that emphasises both the role of the economy.  This importance is a 
key element of the reappraisal of these initiatives given by this paper. 
 
Land value capture has historically been contentious in the UK with a lack of 
political consensus.  Commentators have argued that, as a result, landowners 
simply wait for a change of government, thereby emphasising the role of 
these initiatives in deferring development.  In fact the low level of 
development/land sales in early schemes was mainly the consequence of 
the state of the economy/ property market.  Very often new land value 
capture initiatives were introduced after a property boom and implemented 
during a slump (see Table 1).    
 
In the 1970s a formative consensus began to emerge with Development Land 
Tax that continued until 1985.   After a brief legislative interlude there has 
been broad agreement over the use of planning agreements/obligations 
since 1990.   Planning obligations benefitted from both a political consensus 
and a benign property cycle from 1991 until the end of 2007 that provided 
the base for their acceptability.  It can be argued that the approach has 
been more successful in capturing land value uplift than previous national, 
‘compulsory’ initiatives.  However, there are many questions about the 
efficacy of the scheme, 
 
These surfaced in the aftermath of the global financial crisis when private 
housing completions and land values fell significantly.   The approach 
arguably failed this first stress test.  Various government measures were 
introduced to support it as many development projects struggled to cope 
with obligations committed to in the boom.  More fundamentally the bust 
shone a light on the practices of obligations and ‘viability’ tests. The reliance 
on obligations to provide affordable housing has also shown its limitations as it 
is dependent on the state of the local housing market.  There may be large 
parts of the UK were the uplift is minimal, and there is no mechanism for 
redistributing to low value areas (Raynsford, 2018). 
 
An unresolved issue since 1947 has been the appropriate level of land value 
capture taxation.   The theoretical basis for capturing increases in values is 
dependent on the view that land value is in part socially generated with the 
landowner passive. Nevertheless, it is also accepted that the skills and 
energies of a landowner can also create value.  The rate needs to be set to 
ensure motivation for landowners to develop. The evidence on the 
appropriate rate from the various schemes is difficult to assess because the 
dominant influence on the level of development activity is the 
economic/property cycle.  Tax rates have differed in each initiative but 
obligations definitely have the lowest rate of capture of any of the schemes.   
 
There is therefore an unanswered question as to whether the current 
obligation system is capturing enough land value uplift.   This issue is 
exacerbated as obligations are negotiated. There is also a lack of 
consistency in its application with many local authorities lacking expertise, so 
that rates of capture are subject to substantial variation.  These arrangements 
are in stark contrast to previous approaches where there was a national 
agency in place collecting a tax that had clear if complex rules. 
 
The appropriate rate of land value capture is also an important consideration 
for the level of compensation when land is acquired by a public body.  The 
debate about this question has intensified in recent years with the current UK 
housing crisis bringing calls for the building of significantly more affordable 
housing.  To reduce the public costs one solution canvassed has been 
changing the basis of compensation payments for compulsory purchase 
from market value to existing use value.   
 
This position has been endorsed notably by the Royal Town Planning Institute 
(RTPI, 2017). Such an arrangement would assume the difference between the 
two values is socially generated with a tax applied at a 100% rate.  It would 
return compensation rules back to those applicable between 1952 and 1958 
as noted above. The 1958 change to paying compensation at market value 
occurred because the former distinction was deemed inequitable and 
politically difficult to justify at the time (HM Government, 1965).   The HOC 
committee on land value capture examined this issue in some detail.  It 
noted that while there were human rights issues it concluded on a middle 
way, followed in the Netherlands and Germany.  Its approach would see 
compensation paid to landowners taking into account social infrastructure 
costs (HOC, 2018).  
These questions give rise to a research agenda linked to adapting the current 
approach, namely 
 Viability tests have been put under the microscope, and there is a case 
for developing a national standard ‘formula’, 
 Studies have found different tax rates for obligations.  There needs to 
be a full assessment based on the experience across all regions of the 
UK, 
 The land value uplift from planning permission varies by type of area 
and region, but there is a complete knowledge vacuum on such 
differences, 
 What is the impact on land values, and who actually pays the ‘tax’ – 
landowner, developers or future owners? 
Answers to these questions would make obligations more equitable and 
improve their efficiency. 
 
An alternative model to collecting and generating social value is a public 
development agency, employed previously by new town development and 
urban development corporations.  In these instances, the public agency 
initially buys the land and provides the infrastructure, treats polluted land if 
necessary etc., and creates marketable land plots for private development.  
The cost of initial land purchase reflected current use ignoring future plans. 
These public expenditures can be (partially) recouped by the subsequent rise 
in land values (Jones, 1996).  It is similar to the international models reviewed 
earlier, although these do not employ a dedicated agency.  
.   
In contrast to these schemes, the use of planning obligations remains an 
enigma.  Although this approach has been the most successful (and 
arguably practical) land value capture mechanism to date in terms of raising 
funds, its theoretical basis was always fudged. Further, with unequal 
negotiation strength between developer and local authority, and the 
variation in local policies unrelated to the spatial pattern of land values, it is 
far from perfect.  It represents a victory of practicality over principle, but 
principle had arguably failed in past schemes.  
 
The policy swings following the global financial crisis, first to rescue developers 
and then to rescue the underlying principles of capturing socially generated 
land values have undermined the credibility of obligations.  Despite another 
call for local authorities to gain greater expertise to administer the tax by a 
House of Commons committee (HOC, 2018) this is unlikely to occur.  It is time 
for a rethink.  
 
Since there is a consensus that a greater proportion of socially generated 
land values should be captured, there is a case for reviving the principle of 
employing an explicit monetary rate applied administered by a central 
agency.  A central agency would benefit from specialist expertise and permit 
equitable distribution between areas.  It would remove the contrived link with 
the provision of local affordable housing.  In this respect the London Mayoral 
Infrastructure Levy paves the way with a very successful rules-based tax on 
development size.  A tax on development value (rather than size) would be 
just as easy to administer and allow for subsequent post-hoc adjustments 
reflecting the (localised) property cycle.  It would be a practical solution that 
upholds the principle of taxing socially generated land values, without the 







Table 1 Evaluation of Land Value Capture Mechanisms 
 






Lower land values 
through threat of 
compulsory 
purchase to current 
use value 
100% tax 




Paid by purchaser 
 
Central Land Board Scope was primarily limited by weak 
private development, constrained by 
shortages of building materials and 
licensing. 
 
Land was also hoarded in hope of repeal. 




Limit speculation  
40% tax on 




Levied on seller 
 
Land Commission A credit squeeze limited demand for land 
and housing so market was subdued 
 
Rather than assumed land speculation the 
shortage of land stemmed from planning 
barriers.  Land Commission struggled to 









Tax levied on sale 
of land and charged 
at an investor’s 
marginal tax rate 
 
Treasury Timing of introduction disastrous – coming 
at end of boom it was intended to counter. 
Development Land 
Tax 
1976-85 Capture socially 
generated land 
values to enable 
local authorities to 
pay for 
development at a 
low price 




and current use 
Treasury 
 
The tax was initially part of a two pronged 
policy in which local authorities could buy 
land at its reduced value after the tax.  
Unfortunately its introduction coincided 
with dramatic public expenditure cuts.  
The purchases never happened.  The tax 
enjoyed a degree of political consensus, 
but was abolished on the basis that it was 
expensive to collect. 
Planning 
Obligations  









local authorities.  
 
Tax ‘rate’ is 
relatively low, 
estimated as 27% 
by Aubrey (2018). 





Introduction coincided with a long upturn 
in house prices, but weaknesses exposed 
by the severe downturn from 2008.  
 
It suffers from a lack of transparency, 
questions over the use of viability testing, 
and unequal expertise in negotiations.  
Community 
Infrastructure Levy 
(only in England) 
2010- To help pay for 











About 2/3rds of local authorities have 
adopted CIL; many in low value areas see 
little point. More complex than 
anticipated. Competes with obligations as 
almost all CIL raised from housing. 
 
The simpler London mayoral levy was 
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